By Kai Hüschelrath, Heike Schweitzer
Over the previous fifteen years, the optimum enforcement of ecu pageant legislation has turn into a massive trouble. This ebook includes a designated number of articles through attorneys and economists on present concerns within the private and non-private enforcement of pageant legislation. Public enforcement has been bolstered in different methods – for instance, during the creation of a leniency programme and a considerable elevate in fines for pageant legislation violations. while the european fee has been selling deepest enforcement – for instance, by means of constructing a felony framework that can provide sufferers of european antitrust legislations infringements entry to compensation.
The contributions during this ebook tackle a variety of themes within the zone of festival legislations enforcement, together with the position of fines and leniency programmes in public enforcement; entry to proof and the quantification of damages in deepest enforcement; and the interplay among private and non-private enforcement of festival legislation in Europe.
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Ibid. , J. E. Harrington, ‘Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority’, 35 RAND Journal of Economics (2004), 651–673; J. E. Harrington, ‘Op- Leniency Programmes and the Structure of Cartels 41 maximizing cartel price, since such a sudden and substantial increase in price within a short period of time would arouse the suspicion of the authority and the cartel’s customers. This essay primarily deals with the question whether cartels are likely to change their internal structure – the number of contacts, their specification, the connections between its members – when a leniency programme is in place, and if so, what kind of changes are to be expected.
If the probability of detection is sufficiently high, even a low fine may undercut the profitability of the cartel. In contrast to fines, leniency programmes leave the profitability of a cartel untouched. Instead, they decrease the incentive to remain a cartel member, or to form a cartel in the first place. As mentioned above, leniency programmes have two effects. E. Harrington and J. Chen, ‘Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection’, 24 International Journal of Industrial Organization (2006), 1185–1212.
Smuda, ‘Cartel Overcharges and the Deterrent Effect of EU Competition Law’, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, forthcoming. Veljanovski, supra note 55, p. 80. 34 Kai Hüschelrath in some EU Member States, courts are not only entitled to impose (pecuniary) fines on undertakings for proven infringements of competition law; they can also punish the responsible individuals for (specific) infringements of competition law with either pecuniary fines and/or prison sentences. Individual punishment is normally not limited to the prison term as such but is often extended by the reduced employability of the manager afterwards.